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Diagnostic reasoning in modern medicine is a process of converting observed
evidence into the names of diseases. The evidence consists of data obtained from
examining a patient and substances derived from the patient; the diseases are con-
ceptual medical entities that identify or explain abnormalities in the observed
evidence.
The procedures of diagnosis have not always been the same from one era of
medicine to the next. The "input" evidence has been altered by changes in tech-
nology, and the "output" nomenclature has been changed by new intellectual con-
cepts of disease. An example of change due to new types of technologic evidence
is the identification of pulmonary tuberculosis. This diagnosis, which once de-
pended exclusively on symptoms and physical signs, will today require suitable
microbial and roentgenographic confirmation. An example of change due to new
concepts of disease is the diagnostic designation of dropsy. This designation, which
might formerly be applied to patients with peripheral edema, would now be re-
placed by some other diagnostic term, such as congestive heart failure.
During the past century both ends of the diagnostic process have received many
alterations, but the internal rational pathway that connects input to output has
retained the same general purpose and format. The purpose of the reasoning is
to provide satisfactory explanations for the observed evidence; and the format con-
sists of a branching series of logical decisions, each of which produces intermediate
conclusions during the progressive transformation of input to output. This branch-
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ingpattern of sequential logic is the rational activity that gives diagnostic reasoning
its distinctively clinical character.
Amid diverse recent analyses of the "diagnostic process" (1-11), this distinc-
tively clinical pattern of logic has not been delineated. Knowledgeable clinicians,
although familiar with the pattern, seldom attempt to give it a precise description.
They generally believe that the logic of the pattern is too complex to be stipulated,
and that the rational distinctions are too intuitive or judgmental to be expressed
scientifically.
Because this logic has not been articulated in a clinical "language," connoisseurs
of statistics and computers have used their own concepts of logic to give diagnosis
a new intellectual "syntax." Based on mathematical "grammar" rather than clinical
"idioms," these new diagnostic approaches bear no resemblance to conventional
forms of clinical reasoning. The new mathematical proposals for diagnostic deci-
sions are often derived from a concept of probability called Bayes Theorem
(3-4). In the Bayesian approach, the input depends on the patient's symptoms,
signs, or other medical data, but there is no logical pathway of reasoning. Instead,
a statistical formula is used to calculate, as output, the likelihood that a particular
disease is present. The actual performance of a Bayesian calculation is difficult
(8, 12, 13) because it depends on quantitative data that are seldom available:
the rates with which certain symptoms, signs, and diseases occur in the pertinent
population.
Regardless of practical merits, however, the Bayesian strategy provides only the
computation of a diagnostic probability. In directly converting input evidence to
output diagnoses, the Bayesian procedure ignores the internal path of diagnostic
logic. What emerges is a diagnostic name, but not an explanation of clinical evi-
dence. For example, a Bayesian calculation of diagnosis for a patient with dyspnea
might provide quantitative probabilities for the likelihoods that the diagnosis is
pulmonary emphysema, mitral regurgitation, or cancer of the rectum. But these
calculated diagnoses would contain no explanatory indication that the dyspnea is
caused, in the first instance, by defective ventilation; in the second instance, by
cardiac decompensation; and in the third instance, by cardiac tamponade due to
apericardial effusion secondary to metastatic cancer.
The traditional principles of science require that natural phenomena be ex-
plained, not merely labelled. As stated by Claude Bernard, science "consists in
finding the relations which connect any phenomenon with its immediate cause"
(14). The scientific connections for the relations between symptoms and diseases
can be demonstrated only when diagnosis is performed by sequential explanations,
not when a single statistical calculation is used for instantaneously converting an
"input" symptom to an "output" disease.
My purpose in this series of papers is to demonstrate that diagnosis is a rational
activity of clinical medicine, rather than a computational exercise in numerical sta-
tistics; and I shall try to describe the branching logic of the diagnostic process.
I believe the description will help statisticians, computer scientists, and other non-
clinicians to discern intellectual subtleties with which they are not intimately fa-
miliar as they join with clinicians in developing the potential of new technology.
To make this potential become actual requires adapting statistics and computers
to the practical realities of clinical medicine rather than forcing clinical phenomena
into Procrustean modifications to fit the theoretical concepts of statistics and
computerst
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One of the most prominent realities of clinical activities is that diagnostic reason-
ing may not be aimed at diagnosis alone, and seldom occurs in a direct, continuous
sequence. With major clinical problems, the clinician may be interested not in find-
ing a precise diagnostic identification, but in ruling out the possible presence of
a disease that can be cured or ameliorated. In many clinical situations, the sequence
of purely deductive thoughts may be interrupted by the performance of laboratory
tests or by the administration of therapy. The therapy may sometimes be used
as a type of diagnostic test or as an end in itself, so that the "diagnostic" process
may be terminated without achieving a precise diagnosis if the patient's symptoms
have disappeared after the treatment.
The concluding paper of this series will be concerned with some of the many
important clinical variations in diagnostic sequences and targets. The first two
papers will be devoted to the classical sequence of reasoning that serves as a basis
for the diagnostic process. Because this process is performed somewhat differently
by each clinician, no single account can be acceptable to all the people who engage
in diagnostic activity, and no general formulation can possibly capture all the
nuances of different situations and modes of reasoning. I hope that this series of
papers will represent a primitive beginning on which to build future growth and
improvement.
In this paper, I shall list some of the problems, and define some of the necessary
terms and concepts. The definitions deal with the "input" evidence, with the "out-
put" conclusions, and with a group of macrobiologic entities, called domains and
disorders, that are intermediate branching points in diagnostic reasoning.
THE "INPUT" AND "OUTPUT" OF DIAGNOSTIC REASONING
Observational Evidence
From direct examination of a patient, a clinician obtains two types of data:
demographic and clinical. Demographic data describe the patient's environment
(place of birth, place of residence, occupation, etc.) and such personal attributes
as age, race, and sex. Clinical data comprise the patients' history of the symp-
tomatic development of his illness, and the findings (called signs) that are noted
during physical examination.
In addition to this evidence, a clinician can obtain paraclinical data by examining
diverse substances, derived from the patient, with technologic tests that are not
part of the ordinary clinical examination. The term paraclinical data thus includes
the results of such procedures as urinalysis, blood counts, roentgenography, en-
doscopy, paracentesis, biopsy, cytology, catheterization of various structures, elec-
trocardiography, and the diversity of other modern laboratory tests. Some or many
of these paraclinical procedures may be performed "routinely," regardless of the
findings obtained at clinical examination, whereas other procedures may be ordered
only in response to appropriate "indications."
Diagnostic Terminology
Since the "end-points" of diagnosis are the names of diseases, a knowledge of
available concepts and terminology of disease is a pre-requisite to diagnostic rea-
soning. The classification and nomenclature of disease is a branch of medicine,
called nosology, that has undergone many changes since antiquity (15). The
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changes can best be described by noting the entities that have been regarded as
names of disease, as direct evidence of disease, and as causes of disease.
At the time of Hippocrates, disease was considered to be a purely clinical phenomenon.
It was observed directly in the patient at the bedside, and was identified directly, according
to the observed clinical evidence, with such names as fever, cyanosis, and consumption.
In the medical practice of that era, the identification of disease was an act of observation,
requiring no diagnostic reasoning. Instead, the process of "diagnosis" consisted of etiologic
conjectures about such causes of disease as angry gods or deranged humors.
For many centuries thereafter, clinical phenomena retained their status as entities of disease.
Most of the reasoning of the bedside was concerned with choices of treatment, and with
diverse speculations about pathogenetic causes of the observed diseases. During the 17th
century, Thomas Sydenham founded the discipline of nosology (15) by insisting that diseases
were "specific" and not merely "the confused and irregular operations of disordered and
debilitated nature." Before that time, the doctors who thought of disease as a clinical entity
had regarded each sick person as having his own ailment. Sydenham offered the "ontologic"
idea that a disease might have its own identity and a "natural history" that could be observed
from its clinical course in patients. He proposed a nosologic classification of diseases into
"certain definite species" in a manner similar to that "which we see exhibited by botanists
in their description of plants" (15).
Sydenham's successors in the 18th century devised various nosologic schemas for classifying
groups of symptoms and signs into "diseases" (16). These 18th century nosologies had
no permanent value and have been forgotten today because the "diseases" were selected
in a wholly arbitrary manner. Each nosologist created his own collection of "diseases,"
based on his own beliefs about grouping diverse clinical manifestations together into a
clustered entity called a "disease." The names of the clusters were not related predictively
to the clinical course and outcome of the "diseases" they identified (13), and morbid anatomy
had not yet been investigated well enough to provide morphologic or other "causal" correla-
tions. Having neither prognostic nor etiologic significance, the 18th century nosologies made
no enduring contributions to "disease" or to clinical science.
The confusion created by these arbitrary acts of nomenclature prepared the scene for
the nosologic revolution, during the 19th century, that completely altered the concepts and
names of "disease." The frequent use of necropsy, which had been pioneered by Morgagni
and Bichat, began to reveal a gross morbid anatomy that helped explain the clinical manifesta-
tions of the bedside. Later on, Virchow and others began using microscopy to demonstrate
the many anatomic abnormalities that could not be discerned by naked eye. As these new
forms of medical evidence became available, disease was transformed from a clinical to
an anatomic entity. The gross and microscopic manifestations of histopathology became
regarded as the new "diseases" that accounted for the old abnormalities of clinical dis-ease.
While histopathologists were delineating these morphologic entities of disease, clinicians were
developing such new bedside examining methods as percussion, auscultation, thermometry
and sphygmomanometry; and the new forms of clinical data were correlated with the new
diseases of histopathology.
By the end of the 19th century, these developments had established the concepts and
procedures of physical diagnosis in much the same format that we use today: the clinician
observes a series of bedside phenomena from which he deduces the name of a disease
that is demonstrated in the morgue or under the microscope. As a result of this transition
in concepts of disease, the clinician's diagnostic activity became a process of reasoning
rather than a description of observations. Before these changes, a clinician did not need
to use reasoning to name a disease: he classified the clinical phenomena that he observed
in the patient. As disease became an entity of histopathology, the diagnostic process became
an act of inferential logic, with clinical evidence as "input" and morphologic names as
"output."
With further advances in technology during the late 19th century and thereafter, the
morphologic concepts of disease were expanded to include many additional entities: the
microbial substances revealed in bacteriology and virology, the functional abnormalities re-
vealed with physiology and biochemistry, and some of the "new" modern abnormalities
demonstrated with immunology, electron microscopy, and biophysics.
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During these technologic and conceptual changes throughout the centuries, cer-
tain names of diseases have been converted from one type of entity to another,
whereas other names have persisted because the new nomenclature did not offer
satisfactory substitutes (13, 17). Thus, the old consumption has become the new
tuberculosis, lung cancer, or other modern diseases; the old angina pectoris has
become the new coronary artery disease; and the old familial hemolytic jaundice
has become the new spherocytosis; but the old gout, diabetes mellitus, rheumatic
fever, measles, cerebral palsy, coryza, and epilepsy still remain servicable as diag-
nostic names of modern disease entities. Because of the many alterations and adap-
tions imposed during different medical eras, our current nomenclature of disease
contains a chronologic and intellectual polyglot of diverse diagnostic terms.
Many names of diseases are less than two centuries old, representing abnormali-
ties of morphology (carcinoma, arteriosclerosis, cholelithiasis, appendicitis), micro-
biology (amebiasis, streptococcal infection), biochemistry (porphyria, phenylke-
tonuria, hyperlipemia), or physiology (achalasia, atrial fibrillation). The most
recent of the "new" diseases are being detected with electron microscopy (cyto-
megalic inclusion disease), immunology (lymphocytophthisis), or chromosome
analysis (21-trisomy). But many ancient veterans of diagnostic nomenclature
(gout, measles) still remain in service, together with the clinical clusters called
"syndromes" (chronic brain syndrome, superior vena cava syndrome). Some dis-
eases still bear the names of physical signs (erythema multiforme, hypertension)
or symptoms (pruritus ani, myasthenia gravis), and some are cited according to
personal habits (chronic alcoholism, narcotic addiction) or body habitus (obesity).
A clinical nosography is still the basis for all the behavioral terms used to diagnose
psychiatric disorders (schizophrenia, anxiety neurosis, passive aggression, etc.).
In addition to this generic variety of names for disease, nosographers have regu-
larly employed eponyms when the constituent description was too complex or cum-
bersome for the entity to be cited generically. Some of the current eponyms are
about a century old (Hodgkin's disease, Horner's syndrome, Von Recklinghau-
sen's disease) and others are much newer (Klinefelter's syndrome, Reiter's syn-
drome, Franklin's disease). In some of the newest approaches to nomenclature, the
disease is named after the patient in whom it was first detected (Christmas disease,
Hageman factor), or the city in which the discovery occurred (Philadelphia
chromosome).
Since this potpourri of disease nomenclature was developed chronologically
rather than logically, at least four major intellectual barriers will thwart any at-
tempts to depict the diagnostic process in a simplistic scheme based on a single
sequence of logic or a single statistical formula.
Intellectual Barriers to Simplified Schemes of Diagnosis
The altered spectrum of an altered disease. No matter what scheme of reasoning
is developed to attain a particular diagnosis, the scheme will immediately lose its
validity if the name of the disease is altered from a clinical to a morphologic desig-
nation, or from a morphologic to a biochemical term, because such changes will
immediately change the spectrum of patients who have the disease (13). For exam-
ple, the disease angina pectoris is defined by certain symptoms, but coronary artery
disease can often occur without producing symptoms; similarly, spherocytosis can
be present without the jaundice of familial hemolytic jaundice, and infection with
poliomyelitis virus can occur without any of the neurologic manifestations of infan-
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tile paralysis. Consequently, when disease A becomes converted to disease B, any
statistical data based on clinical or other manifestations of disease A will no longer
be valid for the new clinical spectrum of B; and any clinical sequence of logic
leading to a diagnosis of A must be altered to account for the new manifestations
or lack of manifestations associated with B.
The choice of pathognomonic evidence. One of the main reasons for changing
the names of diseases from clinical to paraclinical entities has been the availability
of technologic evidence that is more specific, objective, and preservable than clini-
cal symptoms or signs. Moreover, the same symptoms and signs can often be ex-
plained by several different diseases, each with its own pathognomonic evidence.
Consequently, many traditional concepts of purely physical diagnosis have become
archaic, and a clinician who seeks diagnostic precision today will often rely on
an appropriate technologic test rather than on diagnostic reasoning alone. For ex-
ample, the combination of hemoptysis and pulmonary rales that may have led to
a diagnosis of tuberculosis 50 years ago will often be "worked-up" today with cul-
tures for tubercle bacilli, cytologic smears for lung cancer, bronchograms for bron-
chiectasis, or cardiac examinations for mitral stenosis.
For a modern diagnostician who knows how and when to order the appropriate
specific tests, any statistical scheme of diagnostic probabilities based only on clini-
cal symptoms and signs will inevitably yield results that are too imprecise. Con-
versely, if the critical pathognomonic test is obtained in advance of any mathe-
matical diagnostic calculations, the calculations become unnecessary. Thus, if a
paraclinical specimen provides unequivocal evidence of lung cancer, the patient has
lung cancer, regardless of the clinician's logic or the statistician's probabilities.
Similarly, if a suitable test demonstrates unequivocal evidence of gall stones, por-
phyria, brucellosis, hyperthyroidism, or lupus erythematosus, these diseases will
usually be diagnosed regardless of the associated clinical manifestations.
Thus, as the technologic tests have become more widespread, safe, and readily
applicable, clinicians have begun to use the results as diagnostic evidence; and the
clinical "end-point" of diagnostic reasoning has often been the selection of a diag-
nostic test, rather than the selection of a diagnostic name.
The choice of a diagnostic end-point. As diagnostic nomenclature has progres-
sively changed from clinical to morphologic to etiologic entities, the clinician wray
have great difficulty deciding when a diagnostic "end-point" has been reached.
Should he stop when he has named an entity that accounts for the main clinical
manifestations, or should his diagnosis extend to each entity that might be regarded
as causal for the one he has just cited? Thus, is myocardial infarction a satisfactory
diagnostic "end-point" for an appropriate type of chest pain? Or should the array
of diagnostic terms extend onward sequentially from myocardial infarction to coro-
nary thrombosis, coronary atherosclerosis, hyperlipemia, nutritional imbalance, and
neurotic personality? The problem of where to stop confronts any design of a logi-
cal sequence for diagnosis, and is insurmountable in any statistical schemes of
probability.
The concurrence of diseases. The last main barrier to any simplistic concept
of the diagnostic process is the frequent co-existence of multiple diseases in a single
patient. The discovery of such polypathic patients has become an increasingly com-
mon event in modern medicine, particularly as more and more patients receive
the screening tests and technologic "work-ups" that provide evidence of multiple
diseases. If the diseases have no symptomatic or anatomic overlap, their different
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clinical contributions can readily be distinguished. Thus, difficulty in hearing can
be ascribed to otosclerosis, and pedal pruritus can be attributed to dermatophytosis,
without any problems in deciding which disease accounts for which symptom. But
many patients have multiple diseases that can overlap in manifestations or location,
and that make impossible a specific diagnostic explanation for a specific symptom
(18).
The clinician may therefore have no definite way of deciding which disease was
responsible for the hemoptysis of a patient who has unequivocal evidence of pri-
mary lung cancer, active tuberculosis, and bronchiectasis. Similarly, the clinician
may be unable to assign the exact cause of rectal bleeding in a patient who has diver-
ticulosis, hemorrhoids, and rectal cancer. In such circumstances, neither a mathe-
matical calculation of statistical probabilities nor a straightforward scheme of clini-
cal logic will solve the clinician's diagnostic dilemma, and he will plan his further
management of the patient on the basis of data that refer to prognosis and therapy,
rather than information dealing with diagnosis alone.
THE LOGICAL DIRECTION OF DIAGNOSTIC REASONING
For the reasons just cited, a statistical calculation of diagnostic probabilities will
inevitably be too crude for precision in modern problems; a logical sequence of
reasoning often cannot provide the specificity of technologic tests; and neither pro-
cedure can regularly detect disease in asymptomatic patients or delineate the symp-
tomatically "active" component of multiple diseases. If the diagnostic process
merits scientific analysis today, therefore, the analysis should be aimed not just
at selecting the name of a disease, but also at helping the clinician choose suitable
paraclinical tests from the enormous technologic array that has now become avail-
able. The clinician's additional decisions about when to "screen" for asymptomatic
disease and how to treat multiple diseases require judgmental concepts of manage-
ment, not just diagnosis alone.
For the purely diagnostic activities of modern clinicians, a scientifically and prag-
matically useful scheme of reasoning is one that can lead, if possible, to the ex-
planation provided by the diagnosis of a specific disease, or, if not possible, to
an intermediate point at which further diagnostic tests or therapy can be chosen.
Since current Bayesian formulations are based only on the "end-points" of diagno-
sis, the probabilistic approach cannot discern the intermediate stages of the diag-
nostic process.
To indicate these stages requires a clinical outline of the successive logical
branchings that reflect traditional diagnostic reasoning. For this outline, the diag-
nostic process can be defined as a sequence that begins with the names of manifes-
tations, and that ends with the names of entities regarded as satisfactory for diagno-
sis or therapy. A manifestation is defined as any item of medical evidence that
is regarded as pertinent; the term includes entities that are sometimes called "posi-
tive findings," "abnormalities," or "pertinent negatives." (The process of selecting
these pertinent manifestations will be described in the next paper of this series
(19).) A satisfactory diagnostic entity is defined as the name of a condition chosen
as the "end-point" in labelling or explaining a manifestation or cluster of manifesta-
tions. If there are no manifestations to be accounted for, the diagnostic entity may
be expressed in such terms as "normal," "negative," or "healthy." Diagnostic rea-
soning comprises the strategy and tactics of evaluating evidence, selecting mani-
festations, evaluating the manifestations, ordering adjunctive tests to obtain addi-
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tional evidence, evaluating the results of those tests, and ultimately choosing the
names of diagnostic entities.
The sequence of diagnostic reasoning follows a rational direction opposite to
that used in explaining the process of pathogenesis. In pathogenetic reasoning, the
logical direction goes from cause toward effect. An example of such a sequence,
showing the possible consequences of a thrombosis of calf veins, is portrayed in
Fig. 1. At each step in the reasoning, a causative event is noted, and the arrows
point to the effects that may follow. The sequence noted here is incomplete; it
does not continue its pathway to cite such possible clinical consequences as fever,
limping, jaundice, incapacitation, or death.
In contrast to this order of logic, diagnostic reasoning proceeds in the opposite
direction: from effect toward cause. An example of such a sequence is shown in
Fig. 2. In this illustration, an attempt is made to explain the causes of a patient's
three concomitant manifestations: dysuria, fever, and tenderness in the region of
Thrombosis of > Phlebitis w Pain in affected area
calf veins ^ Edema of ankle and foot Pain
A Distention of proximal vessel >
witPh Hemorrhae, Hemoptysis
Embolus to Occlusion < Resistance to blood flow may provoke
pulmonary artery cardiac decompensation, shock,dyspnea, or cyanosis
Shock, due to other reflex mechanisms
Pulmonary - Hemolysis P- Jaundice
infarction
Susceptibility to imposed infection
Bronhioiti Cough
Pulmonary $ ~ Hemorrhage o- Hemoptysis
inflommotion Spread to Pleura lo Pleuritis P Pain ~~Rub
Reduced Ventilation Dyspnea Effusion
Cyanosis
FIG. 1. Consequences of thrombosis of calf veins (for details, see text).
Irritation of Acute Inflammation
Dysuria ~ Bladder Mucosa of Blodder
or Musculature (Derangement,
L( Disorder, Domain '1) L Domainfl) Patho-anatomic and
Etiologic Entity:
Thermoregulatory'
Dysfunction of Acute Inflammation E. Coli Ascending
Fever - > Body as a whole of Urinary Tract Pyelonephritis
(Disorder, Domain *2)
Costa- Stecin fAcute Inflammation
Vertebral Stretching of of Kidney
Angle { rden CDaisn D (Derangement,
Tenderness L(Dsorder, Domain 3) Domain13
FIG. 2. Diagnostic explanation for the manifestations of dysuria, fever, and costovertebral-
angle tenderness. The entities identified as domains, disorders, or derangements are discussed
later in the text.
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a costovertebral angle. The pathway demonstrates the logical sequence of the rea-
soning, and the arrows are used here in the logical sense of "implies," rather than
in the chemical sense of "causes." Each manifestation is attributed to a functional
abnormality at a particular site in the body (or in the body as a whole). Each
of these abnormalities is then attributed to an underlying abnormality, and the lat-
ter abnormality is ultimately ascribed to a particular diagnostic entity. (In this ex-
ample, a single diagnosis accounts for all the abnormalities.)
This sequential search for entities that are "immediate causes," each providing
an explanation for its antecedent entity, is the intellectual characteristic that dis-
tinguishes diagnostic reasoning. In this scientific quest, a clinician constantly makes
use of his knowledge of the anatomy and physiology of grossly intact structures,
and he constantly thinks about phenomena that cannot be discerned in fragments
of tissues, in cells, or in infracellular substances. In the rational pathway of Fig.
2, for example, such functional terms as stretching and irritation, and such struc-
tural terms as renal capsule, are strictly entities of macrobiology.
The macrobiology of intact structures is constantly contemplated during diag-
nostic reasoning, although seldom considered in the molecular microbiology of
"basic science." Diagnostic concepts deal with gross structures and intact function-
ing systems; "basic science" deals with cells, membranes, and other fragmented
models. The reasoning of clinical diagnostic activities proceeds from effect to cause;
the reasoning of experimental cellular biology and pathophysiology proceeds from
cause to effect.
Although medical students are often exposed to excellent diagnostic reasoning
by clinical instructors, the concepts of macrobiology and of other constituents in
the diagnostic process may not be formally identified. The instruction is usually
based only on direct precept in individual cases, and no general principles have
been established. For example, when a series of diagnoses are collected and ana-
lyzed (20), the diagnostic tactics may be splendidly illustrated for each particular
case, but the sequential strategies are not formally organized and specified as prin-
ciples suitable for application in a more general approach.
In the absence of a delineated logic, clinicians develop their own diagnostic tech-
niques in an ad hoc individualized manner and are then often unable to recall all
the intellectual mechanisms that must be discerned and stipulated. Consequently,
when asked by medical students-or by statisticians or computer specialists-about
the ingredients of the diagnostic process, a clinician may reply that it is a non-
descript act of artful judgment. The remainder of this paper is concerned with
the basic constituents and sequential reasoning of that judgment.
THE ARCHITECTONICS OF CLINICAL MACROBIOLOGY
Although the end stage of diagnostic reasoning contains the names of various
diseases, the initial stages can be classified into architectonic entities that are unique
to clinical macrobiology. These entities are a group of domains, comprising gross
structures and functions of the body, and a group of disorders, which represent
gross abnormalities in those domains.
Clinical Domains and Foci
A clinical domain is a portion of the body that is the structural or functional
source of a manifestation. A single domain can be composed of more than one
structure or function, and a single structure or function can be a part of many
220DIAGNOSTIC REASONING
different domains. Domains can be classified in the four categories of organ, region,
channel, and system.
Organs. An organ is a discrete gross structure, consisting (usually) of a cover,
a distinctive "parenchyma," an interior "lining," and certain enclosed vessels and
ducts. The stomach, brain, lung, heart and skin are examples of organs; the eye
and ear are examples of sensory organs.
Regions. A region is an anatomically defined part of the body, containing more
than one organ. The head, chest, mediastinum, abdomen, and pelvis are regions.
Channels. A channel consists of a group of structures or organs connected in
a direct anatomic sequence for the functional purpose of transmitting a "flow" from
one part of the channel to another. The "flow" can contain solid, liquid, or gaseous
substances, and, in the case of the nervous system, neural impulses. Thus, the "re-
spiratory tract" is a channel composed of mouth-nose-pharynx-larynx-trachea-
bronchi, and other structures down to the alveoli. The "digestive tract" is a channel
that begins at the mouth and extends through pharynx and esophagus to stomach
and intestines, ending in the rectum and anus. The "central nervous system" is a
channel extending from brain and medulla through the peripheral nerves. Other
examples of channels are the "urinary tract," "bilary tree," "reproductive tract,"
"arterial system" (comprising the aorta and its branches), the "systemic venous
system" (comprising all venous branches leading to the heart), and the "portal
venous system" (comprising the intra-abdominal veins leading to the liver).
Systems. Unlike the three types of domains just cited, which are defined anatomi-
cally according to location and construction, a system is defined physiologically
according to its action. A system comprises a group of organs or structures that
work collectively in performing certain functions. The participating structures in
a system need not have a contiguous anatomic relationship, and the number of
structures will depend on the functional role of the system. For example, the car-
diopulmonary system, composed of heart and lungs, oxygenates blood; the cardio-
vascular system, composed of heart and blood vessels, circulates blood; the cardio-
vascular-pulmonary system circulates oxygenated blood. Examples of other systems
are the hematopoietic system (which is responsible for the quantity and compo-
nents of blood), the endocrine system (which regulates other systems), and the
body as a whole (which maintains temperature, physical energy, etc.).
Diagnostic reasoning begins with the decision that a particular manifestation
arises in a particular domain. If the domain contains many structures or functions,
a focus within the domain will next be selected as the particular structure or func-
tion responsible for the manifestation. In certain circumstances, the entire domain
can be the focus, and vice versa.
Clinical Disorders
A disorder is a gross abnormality in the structure or function of a domain. A
disorder of structure is called a lesion, and, of function, a dysfunction. Disorders
can occur in the quantity, quality, or orientation of either a structure or a function.
Lesions.
(1) Size. In quantity, the size of a structure can become larger or smaller than
normal. A solid structure can become hypertrophic or atrophic; the volume of a
hollow structure can become larger by dilatation or distention, or smaller by steno-
sis, narrowing, compression, or occlusion. The capsule that covers a solid structure
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can be stretched. The suffix -megaly is often used for describing enlargements of
certain structures (such as heart, liver, spleen, and thyroid) but the suffix is not
applied consistently. Enlargement of lymph nodes is often called lymphadenopathy
and no name other than distention is generally used for the enlargement of the
lumen of thin-walled hollow organs, such as bladder or stomach.
These changes in the size of structures can often be determined by the physical
examining techniques of inspection or palpation. Other changes can be observed
with endoscopy, with radiography, or inferentially with auscultation (for dilatation
of cardiac valves) and percussion (for distention of stomach or bladder).
(2) Composition. In quality, the composition of a structure can become abnor-
mal because it is absent, replaced, infiltrated, irritated, consolidated, disrupted, or
distorted. The distortions can take such forms as sacculations, aneurysms, perfora-
tions, shunts, and fistulae.
(3) Location. In orientation, a structure can be pushed, pulled, herniated, pro-
lapsed, involuted, or otherwise displaced from its normal location. Such a change
may be caused by a change in an adjacent structure, or by a congenital or acquired
anomaly of the structure itself. For example, pulmonary atelectasis or a pneumo-
thorax can cause a shift in the mediastinum; an accident of embryonic development
can cause an ectopic breast or spleen, a duplicated bowel, or a situs inversus.
Dysfunctions. The diverse parts of the body have a variety of gross functions.
The functions are expressed in such transportational movements as the contraction
of skeletal muscles, the circulation of blood, the flow of intestinal contents, and
the ventilatory passage of air. Regulatory functions are exemplified by the various
exchanges that occur during absorption, secretion, filtration, perfusion, diffusion,
hemolysis, and hemostasis. Supply functions occur during the formation, decompo-
sition or alteration of such products as blood cells and chemical substances. Ab-
normalities in function, which are discussed in greater detail in suitable textbooks
of physiology or pathophysiology (21-23) can be classified according to their
effects on these acts of transportation, regulation, and supply.
(1) Amount. The quantity of a function can be abnormal in rate of movement,
balance of exchange, or magnitude of product. Thus, the rate of menstruation,
breathing, heartbeat, hemolysis or intestinal passage may be too fast or too slow;
and an excess or deficit of a system's balance or creation of a product is reflected
in such terms as anemia and polycythemia, leukemia and leukopenia, hyperthyroid-
ism and hypothyroidism. The volumetric flow in a channel can be increased or
decreased; and the rates of absorption or secretion in an organ or system can be
excessive or inadequate.
(2) Operation. In quality, a function can be abnormal in the vigor and regu-
larity of movement, or in the achievement of its product or general regulatory per-
formance. Examples of abnormal movements are cardiac arrhythmias, achalasia,
myotonia, metrorrhagia, and spasm of striated muscle. Bence Jones protein and
galactosemia are examples of abnormal products, and cardiac or renal decompensa-
tion illustrate an abnormal regulatory performance.
(3) Direction. The orientation of a function refers to the direction in which
a movement is transmitted. With appropriate abnormalities, a "flow" can be ob-
structed, regurgitated, refluxed, diverted, or reversed.
Interrelation of disorders. Because disorders are both structural and functional,
one disorder is often causally associated with another. Thus, a narrowed lumen
in the pylorus may cause obstruction to the flow of gastric contents; the gastric
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contents may then regurgitate and cause irritation to the esophagus. Dilatation of
the mitral valve ring may produce a partial reversal of blood flow, leading to car-
diomegaly, and eventually to arrhythmias and cardiac decompensation.
PATHOLOGIC CAUSES OF CLINICAL DISORDERS
Although one disorder can often lead to another, each disorder or array of dis-
orders is attributable to an underlying immediate cause, which may or may not
be identifiable in specific terms. Thus, an immediate cause can not always be speci-
fied for such disorders as hyperthyroidism, but can usually be found for such dis-
orders as cardiomegaly or congestive heart failure. These underlying causes of dis-
orders can be identified with several sequential degrees of pathologic specificity.
Pathologic Derangements
A derangement is a general pathologic process responsible for a disorder. Such
entities as inflammation, infarction, neoplasia, trauma, and congenital and certain
biochemical abnormalities are all derangements.
A derangement differs from a disorder in three main ways. Although a disorder
can almost always be identified by gross observation, many derangements must
be examined microscopically or chemically for the abnormality to be specified pre-
cisely. A second distinction is that derangements, in contrast to disorders, are sel-
dom expressed in functional terms because they are identified as either morphologic
or biochemical entities. A third distinction is that a single disorder can be caused
by several different derangements. Thus, in the previous examples, the disorders
of a narrowed pyloric lumen or dilatation of the mitral valve may each be due
to such derangements as inflammation, neoplasia, or a congenital anomaly. Like
disorders, one derangement is often associated with another. Thus, a zone of tumor
or trauma may be surrounded by a zone of inflammation.
As additional illustration for some of these distinctions in nomenclature, consider
the manifestation of dysphagia. This symptom can be due to a variety of disorders,
including such lesions as an internally narrowed esophageal lumen, external com-
pression of the esophagus, or displacement of the esophagus; the symptom can
also arise from such dysfunctions as esophageal spasm or esophageal obstruction.
These lesions and dysfunctions can be due to disorders in structures outside the
esophagus, or to inflammatory and neoplastic derangements involving the esonn-
gus itself.
Patho-anatomic Entities
After derangements have been identified, diagnostic reasoning may often proceed
to the specification of structural entities that are regularly cited as the names of
diseases. A patho-anatomic entity can be defined as a specific topographic and
morphologic abnormality that may lead to derangements and disorders. The fol-
lowing disease names are examples of patho-anatomic entities: epidermoid car-
cinoma of the upper lobe of the right lung; right pyelonephritis; cholelithiasis; atrial
septal defect; rheumatic mitral stenosis; phlebothrombosis; pulmonary emphysema-
slipped femoral epiphysis; and placenta previa.
Pathogenetic (or Etiologic) Entities
This last group of diagnostic terms refers to circumstances or agents that can
cause, provoke, or predispose to the development of disorders, derangements, or
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patho-anatomic entities. Such etiologic entities include microbial, immunologic, and
certain biochemical abnormalities, as well as such behavioral or psychic features
as improper nutrition and emotional stress.
The esophageal disorders and derangements causing the dysphagia described in
previous examples can be due to some of the following patho-anatomic and
etiologic entities: scleroderma of the esophagus; epidermoid carcinoma of the
esophagus; an esophageal cicatrix after ingestion of lye; compression from meta-
static carcinomatous lymphadenopathy in the mediastinum; displacement by a huge
left atrium; chronic esophagitis associated with hiatus hernia; and achalasia.
SEQUENTIAL STATIONS IN DIAGNOSTIC REASONING
With these terms and concepts defined, the sequential stations of diagnostic rea-
soning can now be graphically demonstrated. The sequence is illustrated in Fig.
3, and the discussion that follows is based on the "flow-chart" shown in that figure.
The clinician begins by discerning that the patient has a manifestation for which
a diagnostic explanation is to be sought. The manifestation is then referred to a
domain and to a focus within the domain, although the focus may sometimes be
selected directly. (For example, the manifestation of difficulty in swallowing is re-
ferred to the domain of the upper gastro-intestinal tract, and then to a focus either
in the pharynx or in the esophagus. The manifestation of pain in the eye is referred
directly to the eye, which is, in this instance, both a domain and a focus.)
The next decision is to choose a disorder at the focus. According to the type
of disorder that is chosen, the next step may lead directly to a pathogenetic entity,
or through a sequence that goes to a derangement, then to a patho-anatomic entity,
and finally to a pathogenetic entity. After the disorder has been chosen, other dis-
orders may be invoked as parallel or sequential stations in the reasoning, and these
ancillary disorders may then be the point of departure for the identification of a
derangement and the subsequent entities.
In the illustrative examples that follow in Figs. 4-7, the main purpose is to show
the sequence of stations in diagnostic reasoning. The intricate reasoning used for
the particular decisions made at each station has been deliberately omitted and
reserved for subsequent discussion. In Fig. 4, the sequence of diagnostic stations
is shown for a patient who has been noted to have the manifestation of pallor.
After this manifestation was referred to an erythropoietic focus in the hemic sys-
tem, the next step in the reasoning for this particular patient led to selection of
anemia as a quantitative disorder in the amount of blood. This disorder was then
FIG. 3. Sequential stations in the intellectual pathway of diagnostic reasoning.
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Fio. 4. Sequential stations in diagnostic reasoning for a patient with the manifestation of pallor.
ascribed to an operational disorder-loss of blood-which was attributed to an-
other operational disorder, hemolysis. The hemolysis was then attributed to the
derangement of hemoglobinopathy, for which the patho-anatomic entity of sickle
cell disease was held responsible. A genetic molecular abnormality was then noted
as the etiologic entity. All of these decisions might have been carried out with
purely clinical reasoning, but appropriate paraclinical data would have been helpful
to confirm the initial conclusions about the disorder of anemia and the subsequent
conclusions about hemolysis and sickle cell disease.
Another example of sequential reasoning is shown in Fig. 5. The patient's pre-
senting manifestation is the complaint of unilateral intermittent claudication. The
selected domain is the arterial channel to the legs; the focus is a site below the
aortic bifurcation; and the disorder is inadequate oxygenation of blood delivered
to the leg. This much of the rational sequence is immediately implied by the pa-
tient's complaint; the rest of the sequence requires the use of additional clinical
data and reasoning. In the instance shown in Fig. 5, this reasoning led to the deci-
sion that the inadequate oxygenation was caused by a lesion-a narrowed vascular
lumen-and that this lesion was due to a derangement, embolus to the femoral
Unilateral
Intermittent
Claudication
Arterial Site Below
Channel - a Aortic
to Legs Bifurcation
Embolus Mural Old
Inadequate to Femoral -o Endocardial - Myocardial
Oxygenation Artery Thrombus Infarction
Narrowing Etc.
Vascular
Lumen
FIG. 5. Sequential stations in diagnostic reasoning for a patient with unilateral intermittent
claudication.
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FIG. 6. Sequential stations in diagnostic reasoning for a patient with heat intolerance.
artery. The patho-anatomic source of this derangement was chosen to be a mural
endocardial thrombus, and the etiology of the latter entity was attributed to an
old myocardial infarction. (A separate path of diagnostic reasoning could then be
used to assess the pathogenesis of the myocardial infarction).
A shorter diagnostic pathway is shown in Fig. 6, where the presenting manifesta-
tion is heat intolerance, for which the assigned domain is the body as a whole,
and the general disorder is hypermetabolism. After further reasoning, the hyper-
metabolism is ascribed to the endocrine dysfunction of hyperthyroidism, and at
this point a diagnostic end-point is reached, unless emotional or other events are
to be conjectured as causes of the hyperthyroidism.
The last example to be shown here is in Fig. 7, where the patient's presenting
manifestation is peripheral edema, originating in the domain of the cardiovascular
system. A decision has been made that the focus is the heart and that the disorder
is the dysfunction of congestive heart failure. From the physical finding of a dis-
placed apex beat, a parallel decision has been made that the lesion of cardiomegaly
is present. These two disorders are then explained, after appropriate further reason-
ing, by the derangement of rheumatic heart disease, and the patho-anatomic entity
of mitral stenosis. If a further pathogenetic entity is sought for the rheumatic mitral
stenosis, an antecedent streptococcal infection can be regarded as an etiologic
entity.
Peripheral
Edema
~1
Cardiovascular
System - Heart
Congestive Rheumatic Antecedent
Heart - Heart aSeo Mitral _ Streptococcal
Failure Disease Stenosis Infection
F -* Cardiomegaly
Displaced
Apex Beat
FIG. 7. Sequential stations in diagnostic reasoning for a patient with peripheral edema.
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THE DIAGNOSTIC IMPORTANCE OF MACROBIOLOGY
Although domains and disorders are seldom specifically identified in contempo-
rary accounts of the diagnostic process or of differential diagnosis, these entities
of clinical macrobiology play a paramount role in diagnostic reasoning. They
demarcate the major stations at which the intellectual pathway can change direc-
tions, reach conclusions, or make transfers to other modalities of thought, evidence,
or action.
The Directional Referral of Domains
As an inevitable precursor of all the ensuing decisions, the choice of a domain
is the first major step in diagnostic reasoning, and it establishes the subsequent
direction to be followed. To choose a domain correctly, the clinician must be fa-
miliar not so much with biochemistry or microbiology, as with gross anatomy and
systemic physiology. Without suitable attention to all the gross structural and func-
tional distinctions that can account for the observed manifestations, a clinician may
limit the list of candidate domains to the most obvious choices, thus creating errors
of omission (24) in the diagnostic reasoning.
One of the hallmarks of a wise diagnostician is the broad scope he reviews before
choosing a domain. This broad review is needed not only to include all the possible
candidates, but also to detect the situations in which a manifestation in one domain
is caused by a disorder at a site quite different from the most obvious choice. Such
situations can arise during several types of macrobiologic "referral".
Diaphragmatic distortion. Because of the dome-like spatial configuration of the
diaphragm and because of the way its two sides are innervated, certain intra-
thoracic abnormalities may appear to be manifested in the abdomen, and vice
versa. For example, the pain of a splenic infarct may seem to be in the lower
left chest, or the pain of a myocardial infarction may appear localized in the epi-
gastrium. In a patient with a hepatic abscess, the increased dullness to percussion
above the diaphragm may suggest a pulmonary lesion, and in a patient with em-
physema, a cardiac impulse displaced in the epigastrium may suggest an abnormal
right ventricle or a lesion in the abdominal aorta.
Thus, whenever the region (or organ) under preliminary consideration is either
the lower chest or upper abdomen, the possibility should be considered that dia-
phragmatic distortion has "referred" a manifestation from one domain to the other.
Channel transmission. Another type of possibly confusing "referral" occurs when
the product or consequence of a disorder in one part of a hollow channel is trans-
mitted to another part of the channel.
Because the gastrointestinal, respiratory, and genitourinary channels have outlets
at the surface of the body, a disorder within these channels can be reflected in
the vomitus, feces, sputum, urine, or other substances extruded at the surface. For
accurate diagnostic reasoning, every element in the channel must be considered
as the possible source of the extruded substance. Thus, when blood appears in
the urine, the sources to be considered are not just the obvious choices of kidneys
or bladder, but also the renal pelvis, ureters, and urethra. For a patient with per-
sistent vomiting, the anatomic scope of sources must include lesions not just in
the upper gastrointestinal tract, but also in the colon and below.
When two channels have outlets that are common to both, or close together,
a product that emerges from one channel may incorrectly be attributed to the other.
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Thus, hematemesis may sometimes be mistaken for hemoptysis (and vice versa);
and the blood found in a woman's urine or feces may have come from the vaginal
orifice. A fistula in two neighboring channels may create diagnostic confusion until
the possibility of an abnormal connection has been recognized. Thus, a tracheo-
esophageal fistula may be neglected as a source of respiratory distress, and a recto-
vesical fistula may be forgotten as a possible cause of dysuria.
For disorders in hollow channels that have no external outlet to the surface,
an overt substance is not extruded to provide the clue that may link a peripheral
manifestation to its central source, or a central manifestation to its peripheral ori-
gins. In this way, the heart may be "shielded" either as a source of arterial emboli
or as a cause of increased hydrostatic pressure when manifestations occur at
uncommon distant sites in the cardiovascular channels. Thus, although arterial
embolus from a fibrillating or murally thrombotic heart is regularly considered in
explaining the manifestations of stroke, such an embolus is less likely to be contem-
plated in explaining abdominal pain. In addition, although the manifestations of
dyspnea and edema regularly suggest cardiac decompensation, a failing heart is
not regularly considered as a cause of ascites and mild jaundice. For similar rea-
sons, the prostatic and uterine venous plexuses are also often overlooked as sources
of pulmonary emboli; and an appendiceal or diverticular abscess may be neglected
as a cause of pylephlebitis.
Neurologic peculiarities. The tree-like distribution of the central nervous system
"channel" makes it particularly well suited to diagnostic analysis with sequentially
branching logic. The frequent appeal of neurology to clinical logicians, and the
recent appearance of a logically oriented account of neurologic diagnosis (25) can
be attributed to this branching-channel construction of the nervous system. Al-
though a tree-like search pattern can often be conducted for abnormalities in the
arms or legs, certain peculiarities of neuroanatomic construction and interrelation
must be contemplated in the "referral" of manifestations for underlying abnormali-
ties in the thorax and abdomen. Thus, because of the peculiar pathway of the recur-
rent laryngeal nerve, a lesion in the mediastinum may be manifested by hoarseness;
for analogous reasons in the route of the phrenic nerve, disorders of the pericar-
dium or diaphragm may be manifested in the shoulder region or neck. Through
connections of the involuntary nervous system, cardiac pain may be referred to
the arm, gall bladder pain to the scapula, and appendiceal pain to the periumbilical
region.
A knowledge of gross anatomy, system physiology, and neurologic function is
thus a pre-requisite for the critical choice of domains that constitutes the first step
in diagnostic reasoning.
Disorders as Diagnostic End-Points
In many instances of diagnostic reasoning, the process ends with the identifica-
tion of a disorder, and does not continue on to the naming of derangements and
patho-anatomic entities. Such conclusions-at the disorder stage of the reason-
ing-are particularly common for diagnostic entities of psychiatry, psychosomatic
medicine, and endocrinology.
Many diagnostic terms of contemporary psychiatry represent disorders in the
domain of the psyche (or, within that domain, in such foci as the id, ego, and
super-ego). Thus, the manifestations of abnormal behavior patterns may be ex-
plained in terms of such disorders as depression, passive-aggression, and neurosis.
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In "psychosomatic" medicine, such diagnostic phrases as functional bowel distress
(or the irritable colon syndrome) globus hystericus, and aerophagia are the names
of disorders commonly manifested with "organic"symptoms. Such disorders as
hyperthyroidism are endocrinopathic diagnoses that are seldom carried beyond that
level of identification, although specific derangements can often be found to explain
the disorders of hypothyroidism, hypopituitarism, and hyperparathyroidism.
Disorders as Transfer Stations
Perhaps the most important intellectual role of disorders is the part they play
as transfer stations at which diagnostic reasoning may pause for verification, or
change to another direction.
Until a disorder is identified, the clinician is concerned with achieving an ex-
planation for the overt manifestations of the patient. At this point, the clinician
may pause for one or more paracinical tests to help confirm the selected disorder.
Thereafter, his reasoning often diverges to a new pathway, seeking evidence to
explain the disorder rather than the overt manifestations. These intellectual veri-
fications and transfers can be illustrated with the same series of examples shown
in Figs. 4-7.
In the first example, in Fig. 4, after suspecting the disorders of anemia and
hemolysis, a clinician would probably check the hematocrit and serum bilirubin
levels for confirmation, but the subsequent history-taking, physical examination,
and paraclinical tests would now lead into pathways that are based on explaining
the proposed disorders, rather than the manifested pallor. Thus, the questions
about family history, the inspection of skin of the patient's legs, and the request
for a hemoglobin electrophoresis are aimed at explaining the anemia and the hyper-
bilirubinemia, not the pallor.
In the second example, in Fig. 5, the identification of a narrowed arterial lumen
as the disorder might evoke appropriate roentgenographic tests, and would be fol-
lowed by a shift in the reasoning, away from the claudication and toward an ex-
planation for the arterial blockage. In this way, the focus of the history and physi-
cal examination might be transferred from the legs or aorta to the heart.
In the example depicted in Fig. 6, after choosing hyperthyroidism as the dis-
order, the clinician would probably order a confirmatory test to establish the diag-
nosis. If the gland shows no palpable abnormalities, the diagnostic reasoning might
conclude at this point.
The last example, shown in Fig. 7, provides perhaps the best illustration of the
logical shift that occurs in direction of the diagnostic process after a disorder is
chosen. When the cardiomegaly and congestive heart failure have been identified
as disorders to be further explained, the clinician now looks for evidence that he
has not hitherto used. In this way, the presence of appropriate cardiac murmurs
and the absence of symptoms and signs of other cardiac derangements become
the evidence that lead to the diagnosis of rheumatic mitral stenosis. On the other
hand, if the peripheral edema had been attributed to the disorder of hepatic decom-
pensation, the reasoning would have shifted in the direction of symptoms and signs
suggestive of causes for liver disease.
This ability to use disorders as a transfer station is another hallmark that dis-
tinguishes the knowledgeable clinician. During the activities of history-taking and
physical examination, these transfers enable the search for data to expand into
directions that are not well appreciated by the novice clinician, and that cannot
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be recognized by a clinically unsophisticated statistician or computer programmer.
Moreover, by ordering appropriate sequential tests to confirm disorders, a wary
clinician can avoid both the pitfalls of erroneous diagnostic directions and the
hazards and expense of an unselected "battery" of tests. This important shift in the
middle of the reasoning-leaving the path that leads from manifestation to dis-
order, and changing to a new path that leads from disorder to pathogenetic expla-
nation-has often been one of the unidentified aspects of "intuition" and "artistry"
in diagnostic judgment.
Disorders as Therapeutic Targets
Disorders also have a fourth role that will not be further considered in this discussion
of diagnosis. Many therapeutic actions are aimed at a disorder, rather than at a more
specific disease entity. Thus, the performance of colostomy to relieve intestinal obstruction,
the transfusion of blood for acute blood loss, and the administration of diuretics or digitalis
for congestive heart failure are therapeutic actions that are planned and evaluated for their
effects on the cited disorders, often regardless of the underlying diseases responsible for
the disorders.
With this basic rational pathway described, we can contemplate many other
decisions that occur during diagnostic reasoning. These decisions involve such ac-
tivities as choosing and authenticating evidence, combining several manifestations
into a single disorder, joining several disorders into a single derangement, and per-
forming various other types of inclusion and exclusion. These procedures will be
discussed in the next paper of this series.
SUMMARY
Diagnostic reasoning consists of sequentially passing through a series of intel-
lectual explanatory stations during which the "input" data of a patient's manifesta-
tions are converted to the "output" diagnostic entities or diseases. With advances
in technology and nosology, major changes have occurred in the types of medical
data used as "input" evidence, and in the names and concepts of the "output"
diseases.
The diagnostic process cannot be depicted in any simplistic scheme of logic or
of statistics because: (1) a change in the name of a disease will alter its clinical
spectrum of manifestations; (2) the quest of modern clinical science is for precise
pathognomonic tests that can accurately identify the presence of a disease, regard-
less of the associated symptoms; (3) the etiologic end-point of diagnostic reasoning
will vary with each clinical situation; and (4) many patients have multiple diseases
rather than one. For all these reasons, the process of diagnostic reasoning contains
a complex series of logical branches, and the process often ends not with a diagnos-
tic name, but with a decision to perform adjunctive tests or to administer therapy.
The early stations of diagnostic reasoning include a group of gross macrobiologic
entities called domains and disorders. A domain, which is the structural or func-
tional source of a manifestation, can be an organ, region, channel, or system. Each
domain may contain a particular focus that is responsible for the manifestation.
A disorder is a gross abnormality in the structure or function of a domain or a
focus. A structural disorder is called a lesion, and a functional disorder, a dysfunc-
tion. Lesions can be caused by abnormalities in size, composition, or location of
a structure; dysfunctions can be caused by abnormalities in the amount, operation,
or direction of a function.
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In the later stations of diagnostic reasoning, the sequence moves toward the
pathologic derangements, patho-anatomic entities, and pathogenetic (or etiologic)
entities that successively explain each other, and that account for the antecedent
disorders. Thus, a common sequence of diagnostic reasoning is from manifestation
to domain to focus, and thence to disorder and perhaps to other disorders. The
next steps usually lead to a derangement, perhaps to other derangements, and
thence (if possible) to patho-anatomic and etiologic entities.
Aside from their role as possible targets of therapy, the macrobiologic entities
of domains and disorders have three paramount roles in the diagnostic process:
(1) the choice of a domain determines the direction of subsequent reasoning, and
must be made with awareness of the diaphragmatic distortion, channel transmis-
sion, and neurologic peculiarities that can "refer" a disorder in one domain to a
manifestation in another; (2) in many psychiatric, psychosomatic, and endocrino-
pathic circumstances, the disorder represents the end-point in the reasoning; and
(3) disorders are often used as "transfer stations" at which the clinician may pause
to verify previous decisions, and change to new paths of reasoning for subsequent
decisions.
The next paper in this series is concerned with the diverse strategies used in the
intermediate reasoning that leads from each of these intellectual stations to the
next.
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